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Host adaptation and transmission of influenza A viruses in
mammals
Eefje JA Schrauwen and Ron AM Fouchier
A wide range of influenza A viruses of pigs and birds have infected humans in the last decade, sometimes with severe clinical
consequences. Each of these so-called zoonotic infections provides an opportunity for virus adaptation to the new host. Fortunately,
most of these human infections do not yield viruses with the ability of sustained human-to-human transmission. However, animal
influenza viruses have acquired the ability of sustained transmission between humans to cause pandemics on rare occasions in the
past, and therefore, influenza virus zoonoses continue to represent threats to public health. Numerous recent studies have shed new
light on the mechanisms of adaptation and transmission of avian and swine influenza A viruses in mammals. In particular, several
studies provided insights into the genetic and phenotypic traits of influenza A viruses that may determine airborne transmission. Here,
we summarize recent studies on molecular determinants of virulence and adaptation of animal influenza A virus and discuss the
phenotypic traits associated with airborne transmission of newly emerging influenza A viruses. Increased understanding of the
determinants andmechanisms of virulence and transmissionmay aid in assessing the risks posed by animal influenza viruses to human
health, and preparedness for such risks.
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INTRODUCTION
Influenza A virus is a negative sense, single-stranded, segmented RNA
virus of the Orthomyxoviridae family. Influenza A viruses are classified
on the basis of the antigenic properties of the glycoproteins hemagglu-
tinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) into 18 HA subtypes (H1–H18)
and 11 NA subtypes (N1–N11).1 The combination of specific HA and
NA subtypes is used in influenza A virus nomenclature (e.g., H5N1,
H7N9, H3N2). All influenza A virus subtypes are circulating in wild
birds, which are therefore considered the natural influenza A virus re-
servoir, except H17, H18, N10 andN11. Viruses of subtypes H17N10 and
H18N11 were recently identified in bat samples, raising the possibility
that birds are not the exclusive influenza A virus reservoir.1
INFLUENZA EPIDEMICS AND PANDEMICS
Influenza viruses cause annually recurrent epidemics, which result in
approximately three to five million cases of severe illness and 250 000
to 500 000 deaths worldwide.2 Infection with influenza viruses results
in protective immunity, which is at least in part mediated by antibod-
ies against the viral surface glycoproteins HA and NA. During circula-
tion in humans, the virus gradually accumulates point mutations in
HA and NA, which allows the virus to escape host immunity. This
phenomenon, also known as antigenic drift, explains the occurrence of
seasonal influenza epidemics.
The introduction of a new virus subtype that has not previously
been circulating in the human population is referred to as antigenic
shift. Antigenic shift occurs upon the introduction of an influenza A
virus from the animal reservoir with or without reassortment, i.e., the
mixing of genes from two (or more) animal and human influenza A
viruses. While influenza viruses are continuously changing by anti-
genic drift, antigenic shift happens only infrequently. In the last cen-
tury, four human influenza A virus pandemics have occurred, at least
three of which resulted from reassortment between human and animal
influenza A viruses.3–5
Spanish H1N1 pandemic
The 1918 ‘Spanish’ influenza pandemic was caused by an H1N1 virus,
and is known as the deadliest single event recorded in recent human
history, killing as many as 50 million people worldwide.3 The morta-
lity rates were unusually high among young adults, a phenomenon
that remains poorly understood to this day. Although its origin has not
been fully resolved,3,6 data suggest that the 1918 virus evolved from an
avian virus around 1910, with or without adaptation in an intermedi-
ate host.7
Asian H2N2 pandemic
The ‘Asian’ pandemic H2N2 virus of 1957 was responsible for
approximately two million deaths globally.8 During this pandemic,
predominantly very young and very old individuals were affected.
The H2N2 virus emerged upon reassortment between human and
avian influenza viruses. The HA, NA and basic polymerase 1 (PB1)
genes originated from an avian H2N2 virus and the remaining gene
segments from the H1N1 virus that circulated prior to 1957.4
Hong Kong H3N2 pandemic
In 1968, the circulating H2N2 virus was replaced by the ‘Hong Kong’
H3N2 virus, which has continued to circulate in humans to date.
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During the pandemic of 1968, an estimated one million people were
killed worldwide.8 The pandemic H3N2 virus emerged upon reassort-
ment between avian and human influenza viruses; this time the HA
and PB1 segments of the H2N2 virus were replaced by those of an
avian H3 virus.4 This pandemic was mild compared to the earlier
pandemics, possibly as a result of prior immunity in the human popu-
lation against e.g. the N2 NA.
Re-emergence of H1N1
In 1977, an influenza outbreak was detected that affected predomi-
nantly young adults. This outbreak was caused by the reintroduction of
an H1N1 virus also known as the ‘Russian’ H1N1 virus. This virus was
genetically very similar to viruses circulating in the early 1950s and
lacked years of genetic evolution, suggesting that the 1977 H1N1 virus
was accidentally released from a laboratory.9 The reintroduced H1N1
virus did not replace the circulating H3N2 virus and subsequently these
virus subtypes cocirculated in humans until the ‘Russian’ H1N1 virus
was replaced in 2009 by the pandemic H1N1 influenza virus.
2009 H1N1 pandemic
A H1N1 virus caused the first influenza pandemic in the 21st century
and continues to be detected worldwide.10 In the spring of 2009, the
H1N1 virus (A(H1N1)pdm09) was first detected in Mexico, after
which it spread around the world in only a few months. In terms of
mortality, the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was relativelymild, and preferen-
tially affected young adults. People over 65 years of age experienced a
relatively mild infection because of cross-protective immunity to the
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, as this virus was antigenically similar to H1N1
viruses circulating before 1957.11 The A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was a
reassortant virus that contained the NA and matrix (M) genes from
the ‘Eurasian swine’ influenza virus lineage, while other genes origin-
ate from a ‘triple reassortant’ swine influenza virus that had previously
acquired its genes upon reassortment between human, avian and (clas-
sical) swine influenza viruses.12 The fact that the A(H1N1)pdm09
virus emerged after reassortment in swine supports the hypothesis
that swine can serve as a mixing vessel for the generation of new
human influenza viruses.
PANDEMIC THREATS
In the last century, influenza viruses of threeHA subtypes (H1,H2 and
H3) thus acquired the ability to be transmitted efficiently among
humans. In addition, influenza viruses of the H5, H6, H7, H9 and
H10 subtypes are also considered to represent pandemic threats since
they have crossed the species barrier and infected humans (Table 1).
Fortunately, these influenza viruses so far lacked the ability to spread
efficiently between humans.
Avian influenza viruses in humans
Almost all influenza virus subtypes are present in the avian reservoir as
low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. In this reservoir, con-
sisting primarily of birds living near wetlands and aquatic envir-
onment such as the Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, avian
influenza viruses reassort frequently.35 LPAI viruses are able to spread
across the world via bird migration. Domestic ducks and geese may
serve as ‘bridge species’ for transmission to domestic poultry. Both
wild and domestic birds are suitable influenza virus hosts that mostly
experience asymptomatic infections, despite high virus replication.
Viruses of subtypes H5 and H7 are a notable exception, since they
can evolve in poultry to become highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) viruses, causing severe disease and mortality.
In 1997, a large outbreak of HPAI H5N1 virus infections in poultry
in Hong Kong resulted in the first documented cases of direct trans-
mission of avian viruses from poultry to humans.36 Since 2003, HPAI
H5N1 viruses have spread throughout Asia, Europe and Africa, caus-
ing severe outbreaks in poultry. During these outbreaks, HPAI H5N1
viruses have been detected in various mammals on numerous occa-
sions. As of October 7, 661 cases of humanHPAIH5N1 virus infection
have been reported to the World Health Organization, of which more
than half were fatal.13 While most of the human cases occurred upon
direct contact with infected poultry, a few family clusters of human-
to-human transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus have been document-
ed.37–39 Fortunately, the HPAI H5N1 virus lacks the ability to spread
efficiently between humans, a requirement for influenza pandemics to
occur. However, because the H5N1 virus is able to infect humans, it is
feared that this virus may mutate or reassort with circulating human
influenza viruses, possibly resulting in better adaptation to humans
and subsequent human-to-human transmission.
At the end of March 2013, a novel LPAI H7N9 virus emerged in
China, resulting in 137 confirmed human infections including 45 fa-
talities.13 This virus caused only mild or no symptoms in birds, and as a
consequence stayed undetected in poultry for some time. However, in
humans this virus caused severe pneumonia and acute respiratory
distress syndrome in a large number of cases.20 The H7N9 virus
emerged upon multiple reassortment events between different avian
influenza viruses.40 Even though this novel H7N9 virus harbors mam-
malian adaption markers that have been associated with increased
replication and transmission in mammals, only one case of (non-sus-
tainable) transmission between humans has been reported.41 Several
other H7 influenza virus outbreaks in poultry have resulted in human
cases of infection in the past. On August 14 2013, HPAI H7N7 was
reported in poultry in Northern Italy and in three human cases of
infection.13 In 2003, a large outbreak of an HPAI H7N7 virus in
poultry in the Netherlands resulted in 89 cases of human infection,
one of which was fatal.19 H7 viruses often displayed an unusual tissue
Table 1 Zoonotic influenza A viruses affecting humans
Influenza A virus subtype
Number of confirmed human
cases Number of deaths
Airborne transmission between
mammals
Subtype able to transmit
between humans
Avian H5 (H5N1) 661 13 387 Y 14–16 N
Avian H7 (H7N2, H7N3, H7N7, H7N9) 240 13,17–21 46 Y 22–25 N
Avian H9 (H9N2) 5 26–28 0 Y 29 N
Avian H6 (H6N1) 1 30 0 NDa N
Avian H10 (H10N7) 2 31 0 ND N
Swine H3 348b 32 0 Y 33 Y
Swine H1 (H1N1, H1N2) 21b 32 0 Y 34 Y
aND, not determined.
b Reported since 2005.
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tropism; the virus targeted the conjunctiva, resulting in conjunctivitis,
a symptom rarely reported for other influenza virus subtypes.42
Sporadically, H9N2 avian influenza viruses have been responsible
for human infections.27 H9N2 viruses have become endemic in
poultry populations throughout Eurasia. Furthermore, this subtype
has been isolated from pigs, and numerous reassortment events
between H9N2 virus and other influenza virus subtypes, like the novel
H7N9 virus, have been reported.43 H9N2 viruses with either avian and
human or human receptor specificity are now prevalent in many
Eurasian countries, thereby increasing the possibility of this virus to
infect humans.44
To date, only one human case of avian H6N1 virus infection has
been reported.30 Nevertheless, avian H6 viruses have the ability to
replicate in mice and ferrets without prior adaptation.45 In addition,
the frequent reassortment and the high prevalence of H6 viruses in
birds have raised concerns about H6 viruses.46
In 1968, influenza viruses of the H2 subtype have disappeared from
humans. Therefore, an increasing proportion of the current world popu-
lation is likely to be susceptible to infection with H2 viruses if they would
re-emerge. Influenza viruses of the H2 subtype continue to circulate in
several avian species and pigs, posing a potential pandemic threat.47,48
In March 2010, an outbreak of LPAI H10N7 in chickens was
responsible for the infection of abattoir workers. Reported outbreaks
of H10N7 are uncommon, but these human cases emphasize that this
avian influenza virus subtype is able to cross the species barrier.31
Swine influenza viruses in humans
Influenza viruses with pandemic potential may arise in pigs, because
pig cells express both human and avian influenza virus receptors, thus
providing an opportunity for adaptation of avian influenza viruses,
and reassortment with human viruses when they infect the same cell.
When the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus became enzootic in swine, this virus
continued to reassort with other swine influenza viruses. Human
infections with H1N2 viruses demonstrated the continuous threat of
reassortant swine viruses.49 Starting in 2011, a novel H3N2 variant
virus (H3N2v) containing seven gene segments of swine influenza
virus origin and the A(H1N1)pdm09 M gene segment was detected
in 348 humans.50 Although humans may have cross-protective
immunity due to infections with the seasonal H3N2 viruses that cir-
culated in the 1990s,51 the H3N2v is antigenically distinct from the
currently circulating seasonal H3N2 viruses and can thus potentially
infect a large proportion of the human population. Human infections
with swine influenza viruses appear to occur infrequently. However,
the continuous reassortment with other influenza viruses and waning
cross-protective immunity in humans may eventually lead to emer-
gence of viruses with the potential to spread among humans.
MOLECULAR BASIS OF INFLUENZA A VIRUS VIRULENCE IN
MAMMALS
Influenza viruses from the animal reservoir can harbor genetic traits
responsible for increased host range and virulence inmammals. When
influenza viruses cross the species barrier and infect humans, addi-
tional genetic changes are frequently introduced. It is of importance to
identify and investigate (adaptive) phenotypic and genetic traits asso-
ciated with host range and virulence, to estimate the risks that animal
influenza viruses pose for human health.
HA
The HA glycoprotein is composed of two subunits, the globular sur-
face subunit HA1 and the stalk-like transmembrane subunit HA2. The
HA protein of influenza viruses is initially synthesized as a single
polypeptide precursor (HA0), which is cleaved into HA1 and HA2
subunits by cellular proteases. The sequence of the cleavage site deter-
mines by which cellular proteases HA0 can be cleaved. The highly
pathogenic phenotype of some H5 and H7 viruses is the result of
the introduction of a multibasic cleavage site (MBCS) in HA and
directly correlates with the high lethality of avian influenza viruses
in poultry, primarily as a consequence of systemic virus replication
in these hosts. HPAI H5N1 virus can also cause severe and/or fatal
disease in a wide range of mammalian species, but the association
between HA cleavability and systemic virus replication is less straight-
forward for influenza viruses in mammals as compared to poultry.
Removal of the MBCS from HA of an HPAI H5N1 virus resulted in a
virus that caused only respiratory tract infection inmice, in contrast to
the systemic replication of the HPAI H5N1 virus, indicating that the
MBCS was a major virulence factor in mice.52 However, experimental
infection of non-human primates with HPAI H5N1 virus caused res-
piratory tract disease only with no evidence of systemic virus replica-
tion.53 Recent studies showed that the MBCS in an HPAI H5N1 virus
was important for systemic spread in ferrets, since deletion of the
MBCS from HPAI H5N1 virus resulted in replication that was
restricted to the respiratory tract.54,55 However, insertion of an
MBCS in a human H3N2 virus did not result in systemic spread in
ferrets.56 The increased tissue tropism and virulence of HPAI H5N1
virus in mammals is most likely caused by multiple factors, among
which the MBCS is essential. However, the presence of appropriate
receptors for virus attachment, presence of the proper proteases in
host cells and local innate immune responses also influence the ability
of influenza virus to replicate systemically.
The influenza virus replication cycle is initiated when the HA pro-
tein binds to sialic acid (SA) receptors on the host cell. Human influ-
enza viruses preferentially bind to a2,6-linked SA receptors (a2,6-SA)
which are predominant on epithelial cells in the human upper respi-
ratory tract (URT), whereas avian influenza viruses bind to a2,3-linked
SA (a2,3-SA) receptors, which are abundantly present on epithelial
cells in the intestinal tract of birds and in the lower respiratory tract
of humans. Structural studies have shown that receptor specificity is
primarily determined by the receptor-binding domain (RBD); amino-
acid substitutions in the RBD influence virus host range and cell and
tissue tropism, and consequently, also virulence. For the H2 and H3
virus subtypes, amino-acid substitutions Q226L and G228S in the RBD
(all amino-acid numbering hereafter refers to numbering in H3 HA)
were shown to change the binding preference from avian to human
receptors. For the H1 virus subtype, substitutions E190D and D225G
were important for the change in preference from avian to human
receptors. For the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, the D225G residue was
associated with increased disease severity,57 presumably because viruses
with this substitution acquired dual receptor specificity for a2,3-SA
and a2,6-SA.58
In the HA of HPAI H5N1 viruses, mutations have been described
that changed the binding preference from a2,3-SA to a2,6-SA.59 The
majority of these amino-acid substitutions was located in or near the
RBD. Several H5N1 strains with enhanced affinity for human-type
a2,6-SA receptors have been described in Indonesia.60 In Egypt, new
sublineages of HPAI H5N1 viruses have emerged in local bird popula-
tions that displayed enhanced a2,6-SA binding, but retained binding
affinity for a2,3-SA and were associated with increased attachment to
cells of the human lower respiratory tract.61
Characterization of the receptor binding preference of the novel
H7N9 virus revealed that this virus can bind to both avian and human
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receptors.62 The affinity for human receptors is associated with the
mammalian adaptation mutation Q226L. However, because not all
H7N9 isolates possess this amino-acid substitution, other mutations
may contribute to the human receptor preference as well.
The dual receptor binding of avian H5N1 andH7N9 viruses, as well
as the 1918 H1N1 virus, may be responsible, at least in part, for
increased severity of disease in humans. These influenza viruses were
able to infect epithelial cells that line the lower respiratory tract, the
bronchi, bronchioles and type II pneumocytes, which predominantly
contain the avian type a2,3-SA receptors.63 It is plausible that when
avian H5N1 and H7N9 viruses acquire stronger affinity for a2,6-SA
receptors and lose affinity for a2,3-SA, this would increase their pan-
demic potential, but at the same time, would decrease virulence.
In addition to substitutions in the RBD, changes in glycosylation
patterns of HA can affect host range and virulence of influenza viruses.
In H1N1 viruses, glycosylation sites were shown to play an important
role in antigenicity, virulence and affinity for the receptor.64,65
Introduction of extra glycosylation sites resulted in increased virulence
of the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in mice.65 Loss of anN-linked glycosyla-
tion site located near the RBD in HA of H5N1 virus (position 158–
160), combined with acquisition of human receptor specificity,
enhanced H5N1 virus binding to a2,6-SA.66 In addition, deletion of
this glycosylation site increased the virulence of an H5N1 virus in
mice.67
NA
The balance between the activities of the HA and NA surface glyco-
proteins is crucial for virus replication and transmission, since HA
binds to SA andNA cleaves SA from the host cell surface.68 Changes in
either the binding or cleavage activity can affect virus replication. In
2003, an outbreak of HPAI H7N7 virus in poultry in the Netherlands
resulted in the death of one person and 89 human cases of conjunc-
tivitis.When the sequence of the virus obtained from the fatal case was
compared to the sequence of a virus isolated from a patient with
conjunctivitis, four amino-acid substitutions in the NA gene were
identified.19 These mutations were subsequently shown to contribute
to increased NA activity, resulting in more efficient replication in
mammalian cells, most likely by preventing the formation of virus
aggregates.69
Upon transmission of avian influenza viruses form waterfowl to
domestic birds, deletions in the NA stalk region—which are associated
with increased virulence in poultry—have been detected frequently.70
It is not clear how such shortened NA stalk regions influences viru-
lence, but early steps of the viral replication cycle (binding, immune
evasion, prevention of apoptosis) may be involved in addition to
tuning of the HA/NA balance. The shortened NA stalk region of
H5N1 viruses was also shown to contribute to virulence in mam-
malian hosts.71
Polymerase complex
The influenza virus polymerase proteins, and in particular basic poly-
merase 2 (PB2), have been shown to be important for virus adaptation
to mammalian species. Interspecies transmission requires adaptation
of the viral polymerase to importin-a, which is responsible for trans-
location of the viral ribonucleoprotein complex to the nucleus, since
avian and human influenza viruses require different importin-a.72
Several amino-acid substitutions (E627K, D701N and G590S/
Q591R) have been shown to compensate for the lack of efficient poly-
merase activity of avian influenza viruses in mammalian cells.73,74 The
E627K substitution is the best characterized mammalian adaptation
mutation. This substitution is associated with increased virulence of
humanHPAIH5N1 virus isolates and was found in a fatal human case
of infection with HPAI H7N7 virus.52,69 In addition, most human
H7N9 virus isolates contained 627 K, or the alternative mammalian
adaptive substitution D701N. The D701N substitution in PB2 was
found to increase virulence, and to expand the host range of avian
H5N1 virus to mammalian hosts in the absence of E627K.75,76 The
D701N substitution caused enhancement of binding of PB2 to impor-
tin-a1 inmammalian cells, resulting in increased transport of PB2 into
the nucleus.77 In terms of virulence, it has been shown that E627K in
PB2 is a critical virulence determinant for clade 2.3.4 H5N1 viruses,
whereas D701N in PB2 and other unknown virulence determinants
appear to be involved in the high pathogenicity of clade 1 H5N1
viruses.78 The A(H1N1)pdm09 virus did not contain the mammalian
adaptation residues 627 K and/or 701 N. When the substitutions
E627K or D701N were introduced in A(H1N1)pdm09, no increase
in virulence was observed.79 The lack of these mammalian adaptation
markers in PB2 was shown to be compensated by substitutions G590S/
Q591R, which may affect interaction with viral and/or cellular factors
and promote virus replication inmammals.73Othermutations in PB1,
acidic polymerase (PA), nucleoprotein (NP) and nucleic export pro-
tein have been described that can compensate for the poor polymerase
activity of avian influenza viruses in human cells.80
PB1-F2
The PB1-F2 protein contributes to viral pathogenicity by inducing
apoptosis of infected cells. The 1918 H1N1 virus and various isolates
of HPAI H5N1 virus specifically have an N66S amino-acid substitution,
which is partially responsible for high virulence.81 The PB1-F2 N66S
variant reduced the production of interferon (IFN).82 It was demon-
strated that the PB1-F2 protein contributed to virulence of pandemic
strains and the HPAI H5N1 virus through enhancement of the lung
inflammatory response, resulting in increased pathology.83 However, in
some influenza viruses, like the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, a stop codon
prevents the expression of PB1-F2, and restoring this function had
minimal impact on virulence.84 In addition, PB1-F2 was shown to
promote virulence and increase secondary bacterial pneumonia.85
PA-X
A newly identified protein encoded by gene segment 3, termed PA-X,
modulates the host response by repressing cellular gene expression,
i.e., host-cell shut off.86 PA-X-deficient viruses caused enhanced di-
sease in mice, which was related to an accelerated host response.
Truncation of the PA-X protein appeared to be associated with influ-
enza virus lineages circulating in particular reservoirs, demonstrating
that there may be some species specificity to the evolution of PA-X.87
Non-structural protein 1 (NS1)
NS1 has been studied extensively as a molecular determinant of viru-
lence. One of the most important roles of NS1 is that of an IFN
antagonist, which is accomplished by several mechanisms.88 Influenza
viruses lacking NS1 are only able to replicate in cells or mice that have a
compromised IFN response.89 H5N1 viruses, unlike other human,
avian and swine influenza viruses, are relatively resistant to the antiviral
effects of IFN, which results in increased levels of pro-inflammatory
cytokine expression.90 This effect can be modulated by a D92E amino-
acid substitution, which is responsible for increased virulence of HPAI
H5N1 in mice and facilitates virus replication in the presence of IFN.91
The C-terminus of NS1 contains a PDZ ligand domain (of the X–S/
T–X–V type) that was shown to be an important determinant of
Influenza virus adaptation and transmission
EJA Schrauwen and RAM Fouchier
4
Emerging Microbes and Infections
virulence.92When this domain of NS1 of 1918H1N1 andH5N1HPAI
viruses was introduced in a mouse-adapted influenza virus, it was
shown to increase virulence.93 Recent HPAI H5N1 virus isolates lack
these motifs, which argues against a role of this domain for virulence
for these H5N1 viruses.
Several amino-acid substitutions in the NS1 of H5N1 virus were
shown to increase NS1 binding to CPSF30 (the cleavage and polyade-
nylation specificity factor 30-Kd subunit, involved in cellular pre-
mRNA processing), which was also associated with enhanced viral
replication.94 The A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was not able to block host
gene expression in both human and swine cell lines,95 which is partially
due to mutations that block CPSF30 binding. Additionally,
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus has a truncated NS1 protein with a 11
amino-acid deletion at its C-terminus, and therefore, lacks the PDZ-
binding domain.5 However, after restoring these functions in
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, they did not appear to have a significant effect
on virulence of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in various animal models.95
More studies are required to identify determinants of efficient rep-
lication of animal influenza viruses in mammals. One starting point for
such studies could be the genome sequences of human and avian
influenza viruses, to identify species-specific amino acids. For example,
32 amino-acid residues in PB2, PA, NP, M1 and NS1 were identified to
be different between human and avian viruses, of which 13 were con-
served among 1918, 1957 and 1968 pandemic influenza viruses.96 These
host-specific markers can help us identify the minimal requirements for
adaptation of avian viruses to mammals and may have prognostic and
diagnostic values for improving pandemic preparedness.
MOLECULAR BASIS OF INFLUENZA A VIRUS TRANSMISSION
IN MAMMALS
Several influenza virus subtypes from the animal reservoir have the
ability to infect the human host but most of these are not further
transmitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets (hereafter referred to
as ‘airborne’ transmission) between humans. On rare occasions how-
ever, influenza pandemics may be the consequence of influenza virus
zoonosis. It is important to understand the mechanisms by which
influenza viruses emerge, adapt to the human host and acquire the
ability of airborne transmission between humans and othermammals.
Below, we discuss viral characteristics that were shown to be important
for airborne transmission between mammals. Molecular signatures
that may contribute to airborne transmission of H5 and H9 influenza
virus subtypes are summarized in Table 2.
HA
From previous pandemics, we know that only two substitutions in the
HA RBD may be required to confer binding preference for receptors
on cells of the human URT.98 When previous pandemic viruses were
evaluated for their receptor recognition, it was demonstrated that
amino-acid substitutions inHA resulting in a human receptor binding
preference were a prerequisite for cross-species transmission and
human adaptation of avian influenza viruses.99,100 However, just
changing the receptor specificity of HPAI H5N1 virus was insufficient
to confer airborne transmission between ferrets.14,15,101 A reassortant
virus carrying the surface proteins of an avian H9N2 virus with the
other genes derived from a human H3N2 virus was transmitted effi-
ciently via the airborne route between ferrets. The airborne transmis-
sible H9 HA protein contained the Q226L RBD substitution and two
others; T189A and R192G.29 Inefficient transmission between ferrets
was observed for a virus containing a clade 2.2 H5N1 influenza virus
HA with human receptor specificity, a human NA gene and six other
gene segments from a clade 1 HPAI H5N1 virus.97 This study elabo-
rated on the complexity of genetic changes in influenza viruses
required for adaptation and airborne transmission. Herfst et al.15
demonstrated that the HPAI H5N1 virus A/Indonesia/5/05 (clade
2.1), harboring E627K in PB2 and Q226L and G228S in HA, was
not transmitted via the airborne route between ferrets. However, when
this virus was forced to adapt to replicate in cells of the mammalian
URT by repeated passage in ferrets, this virus was transmitted. Besides
the three substitutions that were introduced by reverse genetics, only
few additional substitutions were observed in the virus genome, of
which two in HA were consistently detected in airborne-transmissible
virus isolates (H110Y and T160A). The receptor binding properties of
this airborne-transmissible H5N1 virus HA were determined via
structural and biophysical studies, which showed increased affinity
for human receptors and decreased affinity for avian receptors.102
Imai et al.14 showed that similar changes in the HA that changed the
receptor binding preference (N224K and Q226L) yielded an airborne-
transmissible H5, but also here additional substitutions in HA were
required. This virus contained the HPAI H5 HA of A/Vietnam/1203/
04 (clade 1) and the remaining seven gene segments from a
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. The airborne virus had only four amino-acid
substitutions in HA compared to the wild-type HA. Quantitative bio-
physical measurements demonstrated that this airborne-transmissible
H5 HA acquired specificity for human over avian receptors, compa-
rable to previous pandemic strains.103,104 The Q226L amino-acid sub-
stitution contributed substantially to the human receptor binding
preference and to the marked decrease in avian receptor binding.
The studies on the airborne-transmissible H5 viruses enabled struc-
tural analyses of the HA RBD from these viruses, and consequently,
highlighted the features necessary for human receptor binding.
AnN-linked glycosylation site inHAwas also shown to play a role in
airborne transmission of H5N1 viruses. This glycosylation site is
Table 2 Molecular signatures in avian influenza viruses (possibly) affecting airborne transmission between ferrets
Study Influenza virus Protein Mutations
Sorrell et al.29 H9N2 (Human H3N2 backbone) HA
NA
HA T189Aa–Q226L–G192R (HA2)
I28Vb
Imai et el.14 H5 (A(H1N1)pdm09 backbone) HA N158D–N220K–Q226L–T315I
Herfst et al.15 H5N1 HA H110Yc–T160Ac–Q226Lc–G228Sc
PB2 E627Kc
PB1 H99Y–I368V
NP R99K–S345N
Chen et al.97 H5 (Human H3N2 NA) HA Q192R–Q226L–G228S
a All HA mutations are in H3 numbering.
b N2 numbering.
c Five amino-acid substitutions were consistently detected in airborne-transmissible virus isolates.
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located near the RBD at position 158–160, and deletion of this site was
demonstrated to be beneficial for human receptor binding
affinity. Loss of this glycosylation site was found to be critical for
H5N1 virus virulence in mice 105 and H5N1 virus transmissibility in
a guinea pig direct contact model.106 In the airborne H5 viruses of
Herfst et al.14 and Imai et al.,15 the same glycosylation site was deleted
through different substitutions, suggesting that the loss of this glyco-
sylation site was critical for airborne transmission between mammals.
Many H5N1 viruses, in particular within the H5N1 lineage circulating
in Egypt (clade 2.2), lost their putative N-linked glycosylation site in
nature. Recent analysis suggested that avian H5N1 viruses from Egypt
lacking the glycosylation site transmit more readily from poultry to
humans than those that possess the glycosylation site.107 These viruses,
fortunately, did not cause human-to-human transmission, implying
that these viruses also require additional mutations.
Recent publications on the novel H7N9 virus demonstrated limited
airborne transmission of this virus between ferrets.22–25,108 Most
human virus isolates harbor the Q226L substitution responsible for
binding to the URT in mammals. However, this amino-acid substi-
tution on its own may not be sufficient for efficient airborne trans-
mission between ferrets. It is important to note that it is difficult to
obtain quantitative data on airborne transmission in ferrets to com-
pare efficiency of transmission between human and avian viruses, in
part due to animal ethics considerations in relation to the required
group size.109 This difficulty is further complicated by differences in
animal breed, age, gender, set-up of the airborne-transmission experi-
ments and climatic conditions during the experiments between dif-
ferent research groups, which may all affect transmission efficiency.
Refining the human receptor binding preference of an avian influ-
enza virus thus appeared to be necessary for viruses to become air-
borne. Recently, it was suggested that the stability of HA in an acidic
environment might be an important additional requirement for air-
borne transmission between mammals. Upon influenza virus attach-
ment and endocytosis, a low endosomal pH triggers a conformational
change in the HA protein to expose the fusion peptide and trigger a
fusion reaction between the viral and endosomal membranes, after
which viral ribonucleoproteins are released in the cytoplasm.
Phenotype analysis in the study of Imai et al.14 demonstrated the
requirement of a T318I amino-acid substitution in HA to lower the
pH of membrane fusion, thus compensating for a decrease in HA
stability caused by human receptor binding mutations in the air-
borne-transmissible H5. In addition, this mutation increased the ther-
mostability of the virus. It has been shown that viruses which fuse at
low pH have a higher thermostability than those fusing at a higher
pH.110 These environmental factors like temperature and pH are likely
to affect airborne transmission. One of the substitutions consistently
present in airborne-transmissible A/Indonesia/5/05 virus, H110Y, was
likely to be involved in HA stability as well.15,102 Several other amino-
acid substitutions are known to decrease the pH threshold for activa-
tion of HA, and could thus determine a similar phenotypic trait. To
investigate whether mutations that alter the pH threshold for fusion
(Y23H, H24Q, K58I) affected the fitness of H5N1 virus, mice were
infected with wild-type and mutant H5N1 viruses A/chicken/
Vietnam/C58/04 (clade 1). Mutant K58I—with the lowest threshold
for fusion of pH 5.4—demonstrated increased replication and viru-
lence, suggesting that adaptation of avian H5N1 influenza virus for
replication in mice is supported by a low pH threshold for fusion.111
The same substitution was responsible for increased replication of
H5N1 A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (clade 1) in the URT of ferrets. In the
absence of changes in receptor binding preference, this mutation did
not alter the transmissibility, since neither the wild-type virus, nor the
K58I mutant virus, resulted in direct contact transmission between
ferrets.112 The pH threshold for fusion is thus likely to be an important
determinant for airborne transmission between mammals only in the
context of a virus with appropriate human receptor binding pref-
erence. Comparison of the airborne-transmissible H5N1 viruses to
the novel H7N9 virusmay suggest that a lower pH threshold for fusion
may be required for increased airborne transmissibility of the latter
virus between mammals.22 Additional research is necessary to identify
substitutions in the H7N9 virus that are responsible for HA stabiliza-
tion, which may confer enhanced transmissibility between mammals.
Identification of amino-acid substitutions that decrease the pH
threshold of fusion and increase the thermostability is important for
influenza virus surveillance and risk assessment of currently circulat-
ing avian H5 and H7 influenza viruses. However, it is important to
note that the increased acid stability and thermostability of HA may
only be a surrogate marker for another phenotype, such as stability in
aerosols or respiratory droplets or other conditions in the envi-
ronment. Nevertheless, transmission via the airborne route requires
the HA protein to be stable in the hosts’ environment.
Polymerase complex
As described above, the adaptation of the viral RNA polymerase is
crucial for avian influenza viruses, since these polymerases have rela-
tively poor activity in mammalian cells. Several amino-acid substitu-
tions in the ribonucleoprotein complex are known to contribute to the
host-range restriction of influenza viruses and increase replication in
the mammalian URT. High virus replication in the URT is critical for
airborne transmission since decreased replication abolished airborne
transmission between mammals.113 In the study of Herfst et al.,15 the
airborne-transmissible H5N1 virus possessed the E627K amino-acid
substitution in PB2. However, it has yet to be elucidated if this residue
was crucial for airborne transmission andwhether it can be substituted
by functionally equivalent mutations. The airborne-transmissible
H5N1 viruses of Herfst et al. possessed several additional substitutions
in the polymerase genes, which may have contributed to airborne
transmission. A K627E substitution was found to reduce transmission
in a direct contact transmission model for HPAI H5N1 virus.
Introduction of D701N in combination with the K627E substitution
resulted in more efficient transmission in mammals, a phenotype
more similar to that of the wildtype viruses, suggesting that this res-
idue can compensate for the absence of 627K.75 In the context of a
human H3N2 virus, introduction of K627E resulted in less efficient
transmission in guinea pigs.75 Studies on the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus
demonstrated that this virus was transmitted efficiently via the air-
borne route between ferrets.114 Nevertheless, acquisition of theD701N
substitution in A(H1N1)pdm09 virus resulted in more severe disease
and increased transmission.115 These data indicate that amino-acid
positions 627 and 701 in PB2 are critical determinants of airborne
transmission between mammals in diverse virus backgrounds.
Reassortment
Previously, it was believed that avian influenza viruses may not cause
the next influenza pandemic directly, as pigs were considered a neces-
sary intermediate host to facilitate reassortment between avian, swine
and human influenza viruses. In addition, pigs were thought to serve
as a critical host for initial mammalian adaptation. However, the role
of pigs asmixing vessel for avian and human influenza virusesmay not
be unique, as humans can be infected with avian influenza viruses
directly from an avian reservoir. Reassortment of the H5N1 virus with
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contemporary human influenza viruses did not easily yield an air-
borne-transmissible virus between mammals.116–118 However, more
recently, it was shown that several reassortant H5N1 virus variants
were transmitted via the airborne route between guinea pigs.16 This
H5 virus, which revealed dual specificity for avian and human recep-
tors, required the PA and NS genes of the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus to
acquire airborne transmissibility between guinea pigs. In addition, the
NP, M and NA genes from A(H1N1)pdm09 virus were important to
enhance airborne transmissibility between mammals. These results
appear to be in contrast to the study of Imai et al.,14 in which a
reassortant virus with a mutant H5 HA with human receptor specifi-
city in a A(H1N1)pdm09 virus backbone failed to transmit via the
airborne route between ferrets. This difference may be explained by
the use of different lineages of H5 HAs. In addition, it is unclear how
the guinea pig and ferret models compare with respect to H5 virus
transmission studies. However, asmentioned above, the avian-human
reassortant influenza virus in the study of Imai et al. transmitted via
the airborne route after passaging in ferrets, when a few additional
genetic changes in HA were acquired. These two studies thus demon-
strated that different airborne-transmissible H5N1 strains can emerge
upon reassortment between human and avian influenza viruses, as was
previously also shown for avian H9N2 virus.
Fortunately, at present, reassortment of avian H5, H7 and H9
viruses with contemporary human influenza viruses has not been
detected in nature. This may in part be explained by the relatively
low number of human cases of avian influenza virus infections, and
the low probability of double infections with human influenza viruses
in a single host. In addition, influenza viruses have to infect the same
cell, and similar timing of infection is necessary to initiate gene reas-
sortment. However, co-infections of avian and human influenza
viruses in humans or pigs may provide new opportunities for reassort-
ment, and evidence from pandemics of the last century indicates that
the likelihood of such reassortment is not negligible.
The emergence of the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus demonstrated that pigs
can be the direct source of pandemic influenza. Reassortment was
responsible for the unique constellation of virus genes, which was
shown to be a critical determinant of airborne transmission between
ferrets,114 in particular the Eurasian swine-origin gene segments.119
The emergence of H1N2 and H3N2v swine viruses underlines that
swine populations should be monitored closely for the emergence of
influenza viruses with pandemic potential. When the airborne trans-
missibility of these viruses was assessed, the H1N2 virus acquired
substitutions in HA (D222G) and NA (S315N) during a single ferret
passage that resulted in airborne transmission among ferrets. Reverse
genetics studies further indicated that these amino-acid substitutions
contributed substantially to the airborne transmissibility.34 The viral
RNA polymerase was also shown to promote airborne transmis-
sion.120 Moreover, four H3N2v viruses, collected from 2009 until
2011, also possessed the capacity to spread between cohoused ferrets,
and the 2010 and 2011 H3N2v viruses transmitted efficiently to naive
ferrets via the airborne route.33 These findings support the continuous
threat of swine influenza viruses to humans, and the need for contin-
ued surveillance.
Unknown determinants of transmission
The role of other viral proteins in airborne transmission has so far
remained elusive. The study of Zhang et al.16 demonstrated that the
PA, NS, M, NA and NP genes are important to confer airborne trans-
mission; however, the key amino-acid substitutions remain unknown.
In addition, it has been suggested thatH5N1 viruses that acquire a long
stalk NA through reassortment may be more likely to be transmitted
among humans.121
Although it is known that influenza virus morphology affects virus
production, the relative contribution of spherical and more elongated
versions of influenza virus to transmission is still unclear. Early work
showed that most influenza virus strains isolated from humans are
predominantly filamentous and, upon continued passage in egg or
tissue culture, adopt a more spherical morphology, which correlated
with increased virus titers.122 It is possible that increased levels of
influenza virus production by spherical strains will results in more
efficient influenza virus transmission.119 The contribution of substi-
tutions in the M gene segment on virus morphology and transmission
warrants further investigation.
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON AIRBORNE TRANSMISSION OF
INFLUENZA VIRUSES
The influenza virus traits that are important for airborne transmission
are slowly becoming apparent (Figure 1): (i) attachment to and rep-
lication in appropriate cells of the mammalian airways, which is facili-
tated by the receptor binding preference of HA; (ii) increased binding
via the deletion of a potential N-glycosylation site in HA; (iii) (acid)
stabilization of HA; (iv) increased viral replication induced by the viral
polymerase genes; and (v) virus shedding as single particles rather than
aggregates, whichmay be facilitated by amino-acid substitutions in the
HA and NA proteins.69
The studies on transmission of H9N2, H5N1, H7N9 and other influ-
enza viruses are of importance to elucidate common mechanisms of
transmission of influenza viruses. The results of such work may ulti-
mately help to better assess the risk posed by the current HPAI H5N1
and H7N9 virus epizootics for human health. Increased fundamental
understanding of the contribution of specific mutations or reassort-
ment events and their associated biological traits to transmission is
urgently needed. It is important to study common biological properties
of transmissible viruses rather than genetic changes in a singular virus
strain, to generalize the mechanisms leading to increased transmission.
Data on the biological properties of the transmissible H5N1 virus may
be extrapolated to the H7N9 virus and future zoonotic viruses, in order
to assess the risk of a new pandemic and to implement appropriate
control measures on time. Mechanistic studies on the phenotypic traits
associated with each of the identified amino-acid substitutions from
previous pandemic virus would be very informative.
Since it is impossible to predict which influenza viruses will preferen-
tially emerge andmay cause the next pandemic, it is key to continuously
monitor the genetic composition of circulating influenza strains in
animals and to assess their infection and transmission potential in
animal models. Since multiple evolutionary trajectories could yield
viruses transmissible via the airborne route between mammals, mon-
itoring the genetic composition of virus isolates alone may be mislead-
ing and phenotypic assays should be added to surveillance studies to
evaluate the threats posed by animal influenza viruses. Since virus iso-
lates consist of quasi-species, monitoring plaque purified viruses or
viruses generated from plasmid clones has to be considered for pheno-
typic assays. Information that reveals genetic changes which could pos-
sibly alter the virulence and transmission potential may help to better
assess the risks of potential emerging influenza viruses. In addition,
intervention strategies and ‘stamping-out’ procedures can be prioritized
and targeted better. Whether a next pandemic will emerge only after
reassortment is questionable, since airborne transmission of a wholly
avian virus between mammals has now been shown to be possible for
both laboratory-generated and natural avian influenza viruses.
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Figure 1 Traits important for airborne transmission of influenza virus between mammals. Increased binding of HA to appropriate cells of the URT of mammalian host
cells contributes to the airborne transmissibility. Increased acid stability of the HA was also observed in airborne transmissible virus. Adaptation of the polymerase
complex is necessary to facilitate increased replication in the mammalian host cell and is a likely determinant of airborne transmissibility. Although this has not (yet)
been shown directly, the release of single viral particles instead of aggregates may aid the airborne transmissibility of the virus, which may be regulated by the HA–NA
balance. Virus attachment and budding images were described previously.123 Fusion and replication data are unpublished. The fusion picture is hypothetical and
shows a non-adapted HA with a high pH threshold for fusion and an adapted HA with a decreased pH threshold for fusion. The replication figure contains data of the
Indonesia/5/05 polymerase complex and Indonesia/5/05 airborne transmissible polymerase complex by Herfst et al.15
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